NOTE:
PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS FOR MONEY

LAUNDERING: A NEW AND
QUESTIONABLE WEAPON IN
THE WAR ON CRIME
I
INTRODUCTION

Efforts to combat vice-type crimes are increasing and taking new shapes.'
In 1986, drugs, gambling, and other types of vice crimes generated an
estimated $150 billion in illegally derived revenue. 2 This money is the
financial base and lifeblood of the drug trafficking and organized crime
industry.3 Recently, Congress concluded that by restricting the availability of
this money, the profit motive behind trafficking and organized crime would
dwindle and fewer drugs would be imported and sold. 4 Thus, Congress
decided to aim at the profit motive in attacking crime. Congress chose to

Copyright © 1988 by Law and Contemporary Problems
1. To economically hinder organized crime and strip criminals of their illegally derived
property, Congress passed forfeiture penalties as part -of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984 & Supp. 1986) (originally enacted as
Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941),
and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute (CCE), 21 U.S.C. § 848 (West Supp.1986)
(originally enacted as part of Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 403, 84 Stat. 1265).
In its most recent legislative enactment, Congress has increased minimum and maximum
imprisonment terms and fines for numerous drug violations, strengthened deportation procedures,
increased appopriations, and enacted a multitude of other provisions. These provisions are aimed at
strengthening "Federal efforts [in] encourag[ing] foreign cooperation in eradicating illicit drug crops
and in halting international drug traffic, improv[ing] the enforcement of Federal drug laws and
enhanc[ing] interdiction of illicit drug shipments, [and] provid[ing] strong Federal leadership in
establishing effective drug abuse prevention and education programs... " Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1, 100 Stat. 3207 (preamble).
2. S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986) (by the Committee on the Judiciary)
[hereinafter S. REP. 433]. The Treasury Department has estimated that Americans spend $80 million
annually to buy illegal drugs. Money Laundering Legislation: Hearing on S.55 72, S. 1335, and S. 1385
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1985) (statement of Stephen S. Trott,
Assistant Attorney General, Dept. of Justice) [hereinafter Senate judiciary Hearing].
3. S. REP. 433, supra note 2, at 4.
4. Id. However, a simple economic analysis would suggest that as supply tightens, prices
increase, thus rebalancing the profit motive. See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, EcONOMics 5974 (12th ed. 1985); R. LIPSEY, P. STEINER & D. PURVIS, ECONOMICS 61-80 (7th ed. 1984).
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achieve this goal by enacting the Money Laundering Act of 1986 which makes
money laundering a federal crime with substantial penalties. 5
Congress reasoned that by making it harder to launder money, the "drug
traffickers would literally drown in [their own] cash" because their money
would be worthless. 6 The criminal and his organization would not be able to
convert their "dirty" money into a manageable and "clean" form which could
then be used in legitimate society. 7 Congress also passed criminal and civil
forfeiture provisions which specifically designate that all profits derived from
money laundering schemes are subject to seizure.8
5. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1351-1367, 100 Stat. 3207,
3218 (enacted as Title I.H. of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 981982, 1956-1957) [hereinafter cited to the Act's future codified sections].
The new money laundering provisions are divided into two sections. Section 1956 provides:
(a)(l) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial
transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of special unlawful activity(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control
of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law, shall be
sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in
the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1). Further, the Act provides civil penalties for violations of § 1956(a)(1), in the
amount of "not more than the greater of (1) the value of the property, funds, or monetary instrument
involved in the transaction, or (2) $10,000." 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b).
Section 1957 provides:
(a) Whoever . . . knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in
criminally derived property that is of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified
unlawful activity, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
(b)(1) . . . punishment for an offense under this section is a fine under title 18, United States
Code, or imprisionment for not more than ten years or both.
(2) The court may impose an alternate fine to that imposable under paragraph (1)of not more
than twice the amount of the criminally derived property involved in the transaction.
(c) ...the Government is not required to prove the defendant knew that the offense from which
the criminally derived property was derived was specified unlawful activity.
18 U.S.C. § 1957.
6. H.R. REP. No. 855, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1986) (by the Committee on the Judiciary)
[hereinafter H.R. REP. 855].
7. In introducting legislation to deter money laundering, Ranking Minority Member of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Senator Joseph Biden stated:
Money laundering is a crucial financial underpinning of organized crime and narcotics
trafficking.... Drug traffickers need money laundering to conceal the billions of dollars in cash
generated annually in drug sales and to convert this cash into manageable form .... Money
laundering is part of the "life support system" of organized crime.
132 CONG. REC. S9627 (daily ed. July 24, 1986).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1). Further, 18 U.S.C. § 982(b) applies the CCE forfeiture provisions, 21
U.S.C. § 853(c), (e)-(o) (1982), to violations under the new money laundering provisions of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957.
The constitutionality of subjecting attorneys' fees to the forfeiture provisions of RICO and CCE
has recently gained widespread attention. Although the constitutionality of subjecting attorneys'
fees to the forfeiture provisions in the new Money Laundering Control Act may be subject to
question, this note will not analyze this issue.
For articles analyzing the constitutionality of the forfeiture provisions as applied to attorneys'
fees, see Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures on the Right to
Counsel, 72 VA. L. REV. 493 (1986) (concluding that the forfeiture provisisons reach attorneys' fees,
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In passing this legislation, Congress hoped to provide a strong
enforcement mechanism to deter the growth of money laundering. 9
However, if Congress intended to subject attorneys who accept bona fide
criminal representation fees with the knowledge that the money comes from
an illegal enterprise, to the new criminal penalties, then the constitutionality
of the legislation is highly questionable. This note argues that if attorneys are
subject to the provisions of the Money Laundering Act, then their clients'
sixth amendment rights will be infringed.' 0 Although Congress discussed this
constitutional objection, the legislative history indicates a failure to resolve
the issue and the money laundering provisions are themselves silent on the
matter.1t Thus, statutory and constitutional interpretation are necessary to
determine whether Congress intended the money laundering provisions to
2
cover attorneys who accept bona fide representation fees.'
The current debate is highlighted in the congressional testimony of
representatives of the Justice Department and the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL"). The Justice Department argues that
Congress intended to subject attorneys to the new money laundering
provisions.' 3 Its official position is that the crime of money laundering is
committed by anyone, including attorneys, who accepts money knowing that it
sixth amendment objections are overstated, and sixth amendment issues should be deferred until the
conclusion of the defendant's trial); Note, Against Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees under RICO: Protectingthe
ConstitutionalRights of Criminal Defendants, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 124 (1986) (concluding that forfeiture
interferes with defendant's right to a fair trial and that RICO must be read to exclude attorneys' fees
from forfeiture); Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171
(1986) (proposing a statutory modification to provide constitutionally sufficient safeguards for
defendant's rights); Note, Attorney Fee Forfeiture, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1986) (concluding that the
fee-forfeiture statute is unconstitutional as applied to attorneys' fees).
For the official Justice Department analysis, see Justice Department Guidelines on Forfeiture of
Attorneys' Fees, U.S. Attorney's Manual 9-111.000 (1985), reprinted in 38 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 300108 (Oct. 2, 1985) [hereinafter Justice Dept. Guidelines].
Although most lower courts have held that attorneys' fees are not subject to the forfeiture
provisions, United States v. Estevez, 645 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. Wis. 1986); United States v.
Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191,
1195 (E.D.Va. 1986); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 195 (S.D.N.Y 1985); United
States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348 (D. Colo. 1985), this position is not universal. See, e.g.,
Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'don other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d
Cir. 1985). Further, the Supreme Court has not heard the issue and Congress has not given any
clarification of its current ambiguous legislative intent.
9. S. REP. 433, supra note 2, at 1. The Senate considers the growth of money laundering
directly proportional to the "spread of profitable illegal enterprises." Id. at 2.
10. See infra part II.
11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957.
12. 2 A. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION § 48.01 (4th ed. 1984).
13. Senate Judiciary Hearing,supra note 2, at 71 (statement of Trott). Even though Congress was
silent on the issue, the Justice Department also takes an analogous position with regard to whether
attorneys' fees are subject to forfeiture under RICO and CCE. Justice Dept. Guidelines, supra note 8,
at 3001-03.
In a recent address, former Attorney General Meese confirmed that the money laundering
provisions could be used to prosecute criminal defense attorneys who accept bona fide fees which are
the proceeds of criminal activity. Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese, III to the ABA Section
of CriminalJustice (1987), reprinted in A Dialogue with the Attorney General, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1987, at 7,
8. Meese did state, however, that the Department ofJustice was discussing the practical, legal, and
ethical issues with representatives of the ABA and NACDC and developing guidelines which would
control the actual handling of a case. Id. at 8.
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is the proceeds of criminal activity.1 4 Further, the Justice Department asserts
that subjecting a defendant's attorney to the money laundering provisions
does not violate or infringe the defendant's sixth amendment rights.
According to the Justice Department, a defendant whose only assets are
tainted and is therefore unable to retain private counsel should not be treated
differently from other indigent defendants.' 5 In contrast, opponents to the
official Justice Department interpretation argue that Congress never intended
attorneys who take bona fide representation fees to be subject to the statute,
and that to make them so would violate their clients' sixth amendment right to
6
counsel and undermine the present adversary system.'
This note focuses on the question of whether defendants' sixth
amendment rights are violated when their attorneys are subject to criminal
and civil prosecution for accepting legal fees which the attorneys know come
from illegal enterprises.1 7 This note begins in part II by examining the
provisions and legislative history of the new Money Laundering Control Act
to determine whether Congress intended the criminal and civil provisions to
cover attorneys who accept bona fide fees. After part II demonstrates that the
history of the Act is ambiguous and congressional intent cannot be
determined, part III argues that subjecting attorneys to criminal and civil
prosecution violates their clients' right to counsel, right to counsel of choice,
and right to effective assistance of counsel. Finally, part IV of this note
concludes that a court may uphold the statute only by exempting from its
provisions attorneys who accept bona fide representation fees.
II
THE MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL ACT

A.

Criminal and Civil Provisions

Prior to the passage of the Money Laundering Control Act, money
laundering was not a federal crime as such.' 8 However, the Department of
Justice had previously used a number of scattered federal statutes to secure
criminal convictions in money laundering cases,' 9 and such convictions had
14. Senate Judician Hearing, supra note 2, at 71.
15. Id. See also Justice Dept. Guidelines, supra note 8, at 3003 n.7.
16. SenateJudiciary Hearing, supra note 2, at 123, 134-37 (statement of Neal R. Sonnett, National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). For a full discussion.of Mr. Sonnett's position, see infra
note 48.
17. Helping the client "wash" his money is widely accepted as a violation of the money
laundering provisions. An attorney should not rise above the law as an exempted party in these
situations. H.R. REP. 855, supra note 6, at 14-15. For example, an attorney who deposits funds, aids
in the sale of property, or creates a dummy corporation for the exchange of stock as part of a scheme
to conceal the proceedings of a crime is subject to prosecution. Id., at 15. See also United States v.
Richter, 610 F. Supp. 480 (N.D. Il1. 1985) (upholding an indictment charging attorney with
laundering money for his client), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Mangovski, 785 F.2d 312 (7th Cir.
1986).
18. Senate Judiciary Hearing, supra note 2, at 129 (statement of Neal Sonnett).
19. Id. Criminal convictions for money laundering have been secured through scattered statutes
under Titles 12, 18, 21, 26, and 31 of the U.S. Code. Most convictions are obtained under various
narcotics statutes, The Bank Secrecy Act, The Internal Revenue Code, The Comprehensive Drug
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been upheld on appeal. 20 The new money laundering provisions are intended
to consolidate prosecutions under one statute, increase the number of
prosecutions, deter criminal activity which relies on money laundering, and
2
provide a strong and effective weapon against the criminal element. '
The Money Laundering Control Act contains two provisions, section 1956
and section 1957, that define the crime of money laundering. On its face,
section 1956 of the Act applies to "whoever . . .conducts or attempts to
conduct . . . [a] financial transaction involving the proceeds of a specified

unlawful activity." 2 2 To obtain a conviction under this provision, the
prosecution must prove that the defendant knew 23 the property or cash
involved in the transaction was derived from the proceeds of a specified
crime, and either (1) the defendant intended to promote a crime or (2) the
defendant knew that the transaction was designed to conceal the nature or
source of the proceeds. 24 A defendant convicted under section 1956 may
2 5 Civil
receive up to twenty years in prison and substantial criminal fines.
penalties are limited to $10,000 or the value of the property involved in the
transaction.26

For a conviction under section 1957, the prosecution must prove that the
defendant (1) engaged in a monetary transaction of over $10,000,27 (2)
knew 28 the transaction involved criminally derived property, 29 and (3) the
property was actually derived from a "specified unlawful activity." 30 Penalties
Abuse Prevention and Control Act, and RICO. Drug Money Laundering: Hearings on S.571 Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 23 (1985) (statement of
John M. Walker, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and Operations).
20. United States v. Lignarolo, 770 F.2d 971, 978 nn.9-10 (lth Cir. 1985) (affirming
convictions under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(1) (1982), for laundering the cash receipts of
drug traffickers and noting that conduct also violated 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982), as conspiracies to aid
and abet the distribution of controlled substances); United States v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984) (affirming convictions under Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1982), for providing money laundering
services to drug traffickers).
21. SenateJudiciary Hearing, supra note 2, at 129 (statement of Neal Sonnett).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). See supra note 5 for the full text of section (a)(1). A financial
transaction is defined as any movement of funds which affects interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(c)(4).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). Included within the scienter requirement of knowledge are
instances of"willful blindness" as defined in United States v.Jewel, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). S. REP. 433, supra note 2, at 9-10.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). Criminal fines are limited to the greater of $500,000 or twice the
value of the property involved in the transaction.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a).
28. 1d. See supra note 23.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a), (c). The government is only required to prove that the defendant knew
the property or cash involved in the transaction was the proceeds of any type of criminal activity. 18
U.S.C. § 1957(c). It is unnecessary to prove that the defendant knew the property came from its
specific and true source, a "specified unlawful activity" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7). 18
U.S.C. § 1957(c); S. REP. 433, supra note 2, at 11. For further discussion of what constitutes a
"specified unlawful activity," see infra note 32 and accompanying text.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a).
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include imprisonment of up to ten years and fines of up to $ 250,000 or twice
3
the amount of the property involved in the transaction. '
An examination of the Act's two provisions reveals that the Act was
intended to be broad in its sweep. For example, the Act applies to "whoever"
and defines a "specified unlawful activity" by providing an extensive list of
activities, including any predicate offense under RICO, an offense against a
foreign nation involving controlled substances, any act constituting a criminal
32
enterprise under the Controlled Substances Act, and numerous others.
If the money laundering provisions are applied to an attorney because he
accepted a representation fee from a client whose money was derived from a
specified unlawful activity, the attorney could be convicted of money
laundering under section 1956 upon proof that (1) he knew the money was
from an unlawful activity, and (2) he knew that the defendant was using the
attorney to conceal (by defending the client from a criminal prosecution) the
unlawful activity. 33 However, a valid defense to a section 1956 prosecution is
that the acceptance of fees for legal services does not place the attorney within
the statutory provisions because he did not intend to promote a criminal
activity or know that the payment was designed to conceal the proceeds of a
crime. Generally, an attorney is hired as an agent to represent the defendant
in a criminal prosecution, not to aid and abet a conspiracy to cover up a
crime.3 4 Congress intended section 1956 to apply only to situations where an
35
attorney or anyone else is "washing" a criminal's money.
Section 1957, on the other hand, seems on its face to apply to attorneys
who accept representation fees, and is therefore the central focus of this
note's analysis. 3 6 Attorneys may successfully defend a section 1957 money
laundering prosecution on three grounds. The first defense is that Congress
31.
18 U.S.C. § 1957(b)(1)-(2). Subsection (b)(1) imposes "a fine under title 18." This
reference is to (1) 18 U.S.C. § 3623(a)(3), which provides the maximum fines, and to (2) 18 U.S.C.
§ 3622(a), which provides a list of factors for judicial consideration in the determination of whether
to impose a fine and at what amount it should be set.
The statute also includes a jurisdictional provision which provides that the transaction (1) must
occur within the United States or in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States or (2) may occur outside of the United States if the defendant is a United States citizen. 18
U.S.C. § 1957(d)(l)-(2).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A)-(D) (subsection (D) lists an additional twenty-four predicate
offenses). Hereinafter the phrases "specified unlawful activity" and "specified criminal activity" will
refer to one of the designated predicate acts under subsection (c)(7).
33. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1), (c).
34. See, e.g., National Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198 (1880); 7A CJ.S. Attorney & Client
§ 180 (1980).
35. See supra note 17.
36. For section 1957's provisions, see supra note 5. See also H.R. REP. 855, supra note 6, at 14-15
(committee assumes that acceptance of bona fide representation fees would subject an attorney to
the money laundering provisions under section 1956, but questions the section's constitutionality).
For a complete analysis of the legislative history, see infra part 11.2.
If one was to assume the government could overcome section 1956's application problems, the
analysis of the provision's effect on the defendant's constitutional guarantees would be parallel to
that of section 1957's analysis. See infra part III. In addition, logic suggests that prosecutors would
prefer to prosecute an attorney under section 1957's provisions because the government's case
would be easier to prove. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. However, section 1956 does
provide for substantially higher penalties (compare 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) with § 1957(b)) and a civil
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did not intend the money laundering provisions to reach attorneys who accept
fees in exchange for bona fide legal services.3 7 A second defense is that the
attorney did not "know" the payment was from the proceeds of a criminal
activity. This position would be extremely difficult position to prove, because
attorneys are informed of the charges against their clients and any assets
which the government seeks to claim through forfeiture proceedings. 3 8 An
alternative and a safeguard against prosecution is for the attorney to demand
payment from sources that are "clean," and thus not derived from criminal
activity, if they exist. In many cases, however, this demand may not be
practical. 3 9 Finally, an attorney can argue that the money laundering
provisions are unconstitutional as applied to his acceptance of bona fide
representation fees because the effect of the provisions violates his client's
40
sixth amendment rights.
In summary, the money laundering provisions of section 1957 are broad
enough to threaten severe penalties against attorneys who accept
representation fees. Further, an attorney's only tenable defenses to a money
laundering prosecution are that Congress intended to exempt attorneys who
accept bona fide representation fees, and that the statute is unconstitutional
as applied to him because it infringes on his client's sixth amendment rights.
B.

Legislative History

The Money Laundering Control Act makes no exceptions in defining the
class of persons subjected to its provisions. The Act uses the word
penalty which is subject to a "preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof. S. REP. 433, supra
note 2, at 12 (test for 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b)).
37. See infra notes 41-57 and accompanying text. The defense is that Congress did not intend
the statute to extend to attorneys in this situation because the application of the provisions would
violate current and prospective clients' sixth amendment rights. Raising this defense might be met
with resistance under the prudential doctorine ofjus tertii. However, under Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976), and Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), the attorney should be able to
raise the third party's constitutional challenge because in this situation the third party's rights are
closely tied up with the attorney's rights.
38. See supra note 23. Congress intended to include willful blindness under the scienter
standard, thus foreclosing the possibility of accepting money for representation without inquiring
into the charges against the defendant or inquiring into his background. Id. This analysis is very
similar to the court's analysis in United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
which involved the constitutionality of applying RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions to fees paid to
the defendant's attorney. The court stated:
A defendant's criminal defense counsel, who obviously has read the indictment and discussed
the charges with his client, could not convincingly argue, if his client were convicted, that he
lacked notice that the money received in payment of his legal fees may have come from the
proscribed racketeering activity ....
Counsel, aware that conviction of his client could result in
the forfeiture of his fee, would be reluctant to handle such a case. Thus a defendant . .. would
be denied the opportunity to obtain counsel.
Id. at 456.
Further, FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2) states: "When an offense charged may result in criminal
forfeiture, the indictment ...shall allege the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture."
39. See, Note, Attorney Fee Forfeiture, supra note 8, at 1025 n.37 (noting that some clients will not
have "untainted assets").
40. See infra part III. For discussion of the possiblejus tertii objection, see supra note 37.
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However, if this statute applies to attorneys who accept

representation fees which are from illegal activities, their clients' sixth
amendment rights to counsel may be violated. 42 Thus, it is appropriate to
examine the legislative history to look for congressional intent in favor of an
interpretation which will reconcile the statute's provisions and the
43
Constitution's sixth amendment mandate.
The legislative history of the Money Laundering Control Act is ambiguous
as to whether Congress intended to exempt attorneys from the Act's
provisions. 4 4 The original bill submitted to the House of Representatives
from the Committee on the Judiciary expressly limited the Act by stating that
the paragraph [making it a crime to engage knowingly in a financial
transaction involving criminally derived property under section 1957] "does
not apply to financial transactions involving the bona fide fees an attorney
accepts for representing a client in a criminal investigaion or any proceeding
arising therefrom."' 4 5 This provision was adopted because the Judiciary
Committee was
very concerned [that without the provision] the potential for... [full] discovery might
have had the effect of inhibiting the attorney's complete investigations of the client's
case (to avoid learning any information which could have triggered this offense) and
with the client's sixth amendment right to effective
would thus have interfered
46
assistance of counsel.

The House Committee, however, concluded that attorneys are not a special
class of citizens and that they should be subject to the money laundering
47
provisions if they aided in a "scheme to conceal the proceeds of a crime."
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1), (b), 1957(a).
41.
42. See infra part III.
43. Courts must, if possible, construe a statute to be constitutional if the legislative history can
be interpreted to show a congressional intent which is reconcilable with constitutional mandates. 2
A. SUTHERLAND, supra note 12, § 56.04. Since the money laundering provisions may infringe on
fundamental freedoms contained in the sixth amendment, see infra part III, the statute will be strictly
construed to eliminate any unconstitutional applications which were not expressly included within
the statute's provisions. Id. §§ 58.02, 58.04. If the court cannot find an interpretation which
reconciles legislative intent with constitutional mandates, it must strike down the law. United States
v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980); 2 A. SUTHERLAND, supra § 56.04.
44. See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
45. H.R. REP. 855, supra note 6, at 1. This paragraph was an amendment introduced onJune 24,
1986, by the bill's co-sponsors and adopted by the Subcommittee on Crime. Id. at 9. There was no
similar provision in the Senate's bill (S.2683). S. REP. 433, supra note 2. However, the Senate
considered the issue during the first session of the 99th Congress in October of 1985 during
hearings of the Committees on the Judiciary. See infra notes 48-53. The House's paragraph was left
out of the final version signed by the President. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
46. H.R. REP. 855, supra note 6, at 14. For an analysis of the claim that a client's sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel are violated by the money laundering provisions,
see infra part III.C.
47. H.R. REP. 855, supra note 6, at 15. For an example of illegal actions which may not be taken
by an attorney, see supra note 17. Further, the crime of money laundering applies to any
businessman such as a stock broker, real estate agent, auto dealer, or jeweler who engages in or helps
a criminal engage in a transaction which the businessman knows is part of a scheme to conceal or
disguise the ownership of criminally derived property or cash. H.R. REP. 855, supra note 6, at 15. An
illegal action can be as insignificant as selling a car or a bag of groceries to someone whom the seller
knows is using "tainted" money. Id. at 14-15.
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In the Senate, a great deal of discussion also focused on the effects of

applying the money laundering provisions to attorneys who accepted tainted
representation fees. 4 8 This discussion occurred, however, only during the

first session of the 99th Congress, and the bill approved by the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary during the second session failed to include any
provision for exempting attorneys who accept bona fide representation fees. 49
In the second session of the 99th Congress, the only clues to the Senate's
intent were the remarks made by Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman of the
50
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, when he introduced the legislation.
Senator Thurmond's statements are especially significant because they were
included in the final Senate report. 5' Senator Thurmond stated that "most
disturbing is the increasing willingness of afew dishonest attorneys, accountants,
and bankers to participate in these sophisticated schemes. "52 This statement
indicates that, like the House, the Senate believed the legislation would only

be applied against attorneys who arranged sham transactions, 53 not against
those who represented defendants for bona fide fees.
Before the bill became law, 5 4 the reconciliation committee struck a
compromise that omitted the express limitations proposed by the House and
55
included only general language making application of the statute universal.

Although Congress never expressly limited money laundering provisions to
exclude attorneys, neither did it give a rationale for the omission of the
House's paragraph. It therefore seems probable that Congress either did not
intend to exempt attorneys from the money laundering provisions or did
intend to defer the question of whether or not to exempt attorneys to the
courts upon a finding of a constitutional infringement. However, it is
48. On one side, Stephen S. Trott, an Assistant District Attorney General, expressed the view of
the Justice Department that attorneys should not be treated differently from anyone else and will be
subjected to the provisions in essentially the same manner as under the Department's Guidelines for
forfeiture (attorney subject to statute's provisions if he accepted the fees knowing that they were the
proceeds of criminal activity). SenateJudiciary Hearing, supra note 2, at 71.
In opposition, Neal R. Sonnett expressed the concern that, without an exemption, the statute
would put an "end to the retained criminal bar as we know it, and [result in] the demise of our
balanced adversarial system ofjustice." SenateJudiciary Hearing,supra note 2, at 124. Sonnett argued
that threatening serious criminal prosecution against attorneys who take fees to represent criminal
defendants (1) denies that client's sixth amendment right to retain counsel of his or her own choice;
(2) impedes that attorney's ability to render effective assistance; (3) impairs the relationship of trust
and confidence between client and counsel; (4) allows the government to manipulate the defendant's
choice of counsel; (5) discourages or disallows competent attorneys from agreeing to represent
clients in criminal cases; and (6) diverts counsel's efforts away from preparation of a defense by
requiring the attorney to litigate issues related to the attorney-client relationship. Id. at 138-39
(prepared statement by Mr. Sonnett).
49. S. REP. 433, supra note 2.
50. 132 CONG. REC. 89626 (daily ed. July 24, 1986) (statement of Senator Strom Thurmond).
51. See S. REP. 433, supra note 2, at 3-4.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. See supra note 17.
54. The deletion of the House's paragraph must have occurred in an unpublished conference
between the House and Senate in October 1986.
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a).
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relatively certain that Congress did not intend to subvert a defendant's
56
constitutional rights under the sixth amendment.
Given the statute's plain language and the underlying legislative history, a
court which accepts the argument that the statute violates a defendant's sixth
amendment rights will probably construe the statute to avoid an
unconstitutional application and a striking down of the statute. Thus, the
court would likely create an exemption for attorneys who accept bona fide
57
representation fees which they know are tainted.
III
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND ITS APPLICATIONS
TO DEFENDANTS WHOSE ATTORNEYS ARE THREATENED
WITH PROSECUTION

The sixth amendment, which provides that "in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his

defense," 5 8 has been interpreted to include three distinct rights: the right to
representation by counsel, 5 9 the right to counsel of choice, 60 and the right to
61
effective assistance of counsel.

A.

Right to Counsel

The right to representation by counsel is guaranteed in all criminal
prosecutions. 6 2 However, if private criminal attorneys as a class feel
threatened with criminal or civil prosecution, 63 they will be highly reluctant to
56. In an analogous situation, the lower federal courts have split on the question of whether
Congress intended to subject attorney fee-forfeitures under RICO and CCE provisions, see supra note
8, in light of congressional silence in the legislative history and one congressional footnote which
provided, "Nothing in this section is intended to interfere with a person's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel." H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, n.1 (1984). For a complete list of sources
which discuss the constitutional implications of subjecting attorneys' fees to forteiture, see supra note
8.
57. See supra note 43.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
59. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 356-58 (1963) (right to counsel through defendant's first direct appeal); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 66 (1932). See also infra part III.A.
60. See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958), revd on other grounds, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (fourteenth amendment secures in state prosecutions the right to an
opportunity to retain counsel of one's own choosing); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954)
(defendant must be given responsible opportunity to employ and consult with counsel); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66 (1932) (right to counsel includes a fair opportunity to retain counsel of
choice). See also infra part III.B.
61. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (expressly recognizing right);
Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1983) (putting forth a definite two-part test). See also
infra part III.C.
62. See supra note 59. For a Supreme Court history of the right to counsel, see Berger, The
Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 13-102
(1986); Note, Wilson v. Mintzes: A Case of Ineffective Assistance or Denial of Counsel of Choice, 17 U. TOL.
L. REV. 615, 616-22 (1986).
63. The situation presented would involve acceptance of a fee from a client who is charged with
a "specified unlawful activity", which is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7), and whose money the
attorney knows came from an illegal source.
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represent a defendant who is charged with criminal activities. 64 Further, an
attorney's exposure is increased by the threat of state bar sanctions 65 and
possible vindictive prosecution by U.S. Attorneys who lose the underlying
66
criminal case and want a scapegoat.
The Money Laundering Control Act's chilling effect on the availability of
retained counsel is a problem that the Justice Department believes can be
solved by the appointment of counsel. 6 7 However, the effectiveness of this
alternative is questionable. If a client is "too hot to handle" 68 and cannot
obtain private representation because all of his assets are tainted, 6 9 the court

will have to consider the defendant "financially unable to obtain adequate
representation" and appoint counsel under the Criminal Justice Act. 70 Some
courts and critics have noted that the public defense bar lacks the resources,
expertise, and time necessary to represent competently defendants charged
7
with RICO, drug trafficking, and vice-type offenses. '
One federal district court has recently observed that mounting a RICO

defense is "far beyond the resources or expertise of the average federal public
defender's office" because it is already overtaxed, the issues in these cases are
extremely complex, the facts and information to be marshalled are vast, and
the time required for representation often lasts two or three years during
grand jury investigations. 72 The court concluded that "[c]ounsel appointed
ninety or one hundred and twenty days before trial [under the Criminal
Justise Act] is patently inadequate." 7 3 Although the Criminal Justice Act will
64. Compounding the chilling effect of prosecution is the attorney's exposure to government
seizure of his fee under the forfeiture provisions of the Money Laundering Control Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 981-982, RICO or CCE. See supra note 1. In general, an attorney cannot afford to handle long and
complex cases without an assurance of payment. See Note, Against Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under
RICO, supra note 8, at 133-34.
65. State bar sanctions can be based upon violations of the independence requirements of the
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canons 4, 5, 9 (1980). See generally 7 Am. JUR. 2D
Attorneys at Law §§ 40, 48-55 (1980).
66. See infra part III.C.3.
67. Justice Dept. Guidelines, supra note 8, at 3002.
68. This expression designates a defendant whose assets were all derived from criminal activity
and against whom the government has a solid case.
69. A serious threat of criminal prosecution against an attorney who accepts a case for a fee
would probably discourage all members of the private bar, unless one takes the case in order to
challenge the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1956-57, as applied to attorneys.
In United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), the court stated that an
attorney was either "foolish, ignorant, beholden or idealist" to take a case where the attorney's fee
was subject to forfeiture. An analogous situation exists here, except the penalties are enhanced. See
supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
70. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(a) (1982). See also Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding that a court must appoint counsel if the defendant is unable to
retain counsel); FED. R. Civ. P. 44(a) (indigent defendants have the right to appointed counsel from
initial appearance through appeal).
71. See Krieger & Van Dusen, The Lawyer, The Client and The Law, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 737,73940 (1984) (acknowledging the accomplishments and capabilities of the Public Defender's Office, but
noting that they were not designed to replace the private lawyer in situations which require
specialists, such as drug trafficking and RICO prosecutions); Note, Attorney Fee Forfeiture, supra note 8,
at 1045 (noting the "ills afflicting" the public bar).
72. United States v. Rogers, 602 F.Supp 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985).
73. Id. (emphasis added).
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force courts to appoint counsel as constitutionally required, if the public bar is
unable to represent a defendant adequately, his sixth amendment right to
counsel is infringed.
A second objection arises from the taxpayer. It seems grossly unfair that
tax dollars should be spent to pay the legal fees of a wealthy defendant in
order to protect his attorney from prosecution. The social cost of appointing
free counsel to wealthy defendants includes money, time, and resources which
could be used in the representation of truly indigent defendants. This cost is
unjustifiably high in relation to the social cost of exempting attorneys from
prosecution upon proof that fees paid were for the bona fide representation
74
of a client.
B.

Right to Counsel of Choice

In Powell v. Alabama 75 the United States Supreme Court recognized that a
defendant must be "afforded" a "fair opportunity to secure counsel of his
own choice." Although this right is not absolute, 7 6 the courts have balanced
the public's interest in the orderly and efficient administration of justice
against the defendant's interest in obtaining a prompt and fair trial and in
77
exercising his right to choice of counsel.
In attorney fee forfeiture cases, 78 the problems that result from attempting
to seize the defendant's assets are similar to the concerns of the Powell Court.
The difficulty is not that the defendant cannot afford to hire a particular
attorney of his choice, but that no attorney can be retained because of the
government's threat of seizure of the defendant's assets, including fees paid
to or owed to his attorney. 79 The money laundering provisions create a
74. An alternative solution to the apparent unfairness of forcing society to spend tax dollars to
pay for a wealthy defendant's representation would be to strip the defendant of his assets, thus
making him an indigent. However, this solution would violate the fifth amendment's due process
clause, and the principle that one is innocent until proven guilty. U.S. CONST., amend. V.
75. 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932). See also cases cited supra note 60.
76. See, e.g., Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1983) (balancing process applied); United
States v. Curicio, 680 F.2d 881, 890 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 86 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977).
77. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1983) (victim's rights considered in balancing
process); Hollaway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 486-87 (1978) (administrative concern over delay
tactics); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 588-91 (1963) (no mechanical test to apply, look at
circumstances of each case). For a history of the right to counsel of choice, see Note, supra note 62, at
630-34.
Indigents are appointed counsel by the court under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)
(1982). Most courts and commentators do not recognize a right to counsel of choice for indigents.
However, substitute counsel must be appointed upon a showing of good cause. United States v.
Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973) (no right to pick a particular lawyer or demand substitute
except for good cause); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Calabro,
467 F.2d 973, 986 (2d Cir. 1972) (in order to warrant appointment of substitute counsel, defendant
must show good cause, such as conflict of interest, irreconcilable differences, or complete
communication breakdown). See generally Berger, supra note 62, at 49-55; Tague, An Indigent's Right to
the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1974).
78. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
79. United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (the problem is that
"lawyers will refuse to accept [the client's] retainer and refuse to represent him"). See supra notes 6371 and accompanying text.
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similar situation in which a defendant cannot retain an attorney because of the
government's threat of criminal and civil sanctions against any attorney who
takes the case for a fee.8 0 Tying this unavailability of counsel directly to the
threat of government action leads to a balancing of the defendant's interest in
his sixth amendment right to counsel of choice against the government's
interest in enforcing the money laundering provisions against attorneys who
take bona fide representation fees which are tainted.
Congress's purpose in passing the Money Laundering Control Act 8 ' was
to stop the "spread of profitable illegal enterprises" by depriving criminals of
the methods used to disguise the illegal nature and true sources of their
income. 8 2 Subjecting attorneys to criminal prosecution for accepting tainted
representation fees does not interfere with the government's interest in
shutting down money laundering operations, 8 3 because attorneys serve the
purpose of providing counsel to defendants who are accused of a crime, not
one of encouraging the defendant's illegal conduct. TheJustice Department's
approach is confusing in that it advocates attacking the basic structure of the
adversarial system of justice in its attempt to stop drug trafficking and vicetype crimes.
The right to counsel of choice was designed to ensure objective fairness in
the proceedings8 4 and is essential to maintain the integrity of the adversarial
system of justice. 8 5 The threat of criminal or civil prosecution against an
attorney interferes with his client's right of free choice, 8 6 denies him a fair
opportunity to hire counsel,8 7 impedes the fairness of the proceedings,88 and
destroys the integrity of the adversarial system ofjustice. 89 The statute must
therefore either bend to allow an exception or be ruled unconstitutional: The
government's interest in subjecting attorneys to the money laundering
provisions clearly does not outweigh the potential damage to the defendant's
right to counsel of choice. 90
80. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
81. See supra note 5.
82. See supra note 77.
83. It is accepted that the Department ofJustice can constitutionally prosecute an attorney who
is "washing" money for a client through the creation of sham transactions. See supra notes 17, 47.
To conclude that the payment of legal fees encourages money laundering ignores economic
realities. Criminals and drug traffickers launder profits from illegal transactions in order to be able
to spend it on obtaining property in legitimate society, not to pay attorneys for services rendered.
Further, the amount spent in defending oneself by hiring an attorney, say $40,000, is minute
compared to the profits made on a $150 billion industry. S. REP. 433 supra note 2, at 2.
84. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984); United States v. Morrison, 449
U.S. 361, 364 (1981); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
85. Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1981) (right to counsel of choice is necessary to
maintain basic trust between client and attorney, a cornerstone of the adversarial system), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1162 (1982).
86. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1974) (the defendant's free choice must be
honored as it is one of the basic elements on which the law is based).
87. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text; infra part III.C.
89. See infra part III.C.3.
90. A court faced with the realization that the statute is unconstitutional as applied will have the
options of striking down the whole statute or holding that Congress did not intend the statute to
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Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel 9'

C.

1. Conflict of Interest. The sixth amendment also embodies the right to
effective assistance of counsel. 92 This right is infringed when a defendant,
who is charged with a specific predicate offense under the Act, 93 retains an
attorney whose interests are in conflict with those of his clients.
In Strickland v. Washington,9 4 the court stated that the government violates a
defendant's right to effective counsel when it interferes "with the ability of
counsel to make independent decisions." The defendant's right can also be
infringed by his own counsel by "failing to render 'adequate legal
assistance.' -95 In certain situations, a presumption of prejudice arises from
violation of the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. 9 6 The
presumption arises, for example, when the defendant is actually or
constructively denied assistance of counsel, when the prosecution interferes
with counsel's assistance, or when counsel has an actual conflict of interest
97
with his client.
By subjecting attorneys to the threat of criminal and civil penalties for
accepting bona fide representation fees, the government creates a conflict of
interest between the attorney and client. 9 8 This conflict arises because the
apply to the unconstitutional situation. Because courts must adopt a constitutional statutory
interpretation when the legislative intent will support it, 2 A. SUrHERLAND, supra note 12, § 56.04, a
court should also opt for creating an exception where the legislative history is ambiguous. See supra
note 43.
91. Ineffective assistance claims are almost exclusively raised as a basis for reversal of a criminal
conviction and predicated on what happened at trial. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984) (defendant claimed denial of effective assistance during trial and sentencing hearing); United
States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir. 1970) (defendant claimed counsel was sleeping during
trial). However, this note's purpose is to show that a defendant, whose criminal defense attorney
accepts his case for a fee, in light of the criminal penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, is automatically
deprived of his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because of the inherent
conflicts of interest which permeate the attorney-client relationship and the adversarial process.
92.
93.

See supra note 61.
See supra note 32.

94. 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The court set out a two-pronged test when analyzing a claim that
counsel failed to render adequate assistance. The test states:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was unreasonable on the facts of the
particular case. This requires that a convicted defendant identify acts or omissions of counsel
that are not the result of reasonable professional judgment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.
Id. at 687.
95. Id. at 686 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)).
96. Id. at 692. In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 nn.25, 26 (1984) (companion case
to Strickland v. Washington), the Court stated that in order to have a sixth amendment violation, the
government's interference must be of the "magnitude" of counsel being "either totally absent, or
prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceedings." For an argument
that the money laundering provisions constructively prevent the assistance of counsel by creating
conflicts of interest which force the defendant's attorney to give erroneous advice, see infra text
accompanying notes 98-105.
97. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 692. Counsel breaches his duty of loyalty when
burdened by an actual conflict of interest. Id. at 692 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 345-50).
98. See infra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
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attorney's criminal and civil liability is determined, in part, by the outcome of
the defendant's trial.
In money laundering prosecutions against an attorney whose client has
been convicted, the prosecution's burden is limited to proving that the money
was derived from a statutorily designated illegal source and that counsel knew
of this fact. 99 In most section 1957 cases this burden is reduced because the
prosecution usually goes after the defendant's assets in a simultaneous
forfeiture action under RICO or CCE. 10 0 In these circumstances, the jury is
instructed to render a special verdict determining which assets were criminally
derived and must be forfeited. Thus, if the attorney accepted any of these
forfeited assets as payment, the first part of the prosecution's case is complete.
Successful prosecution of attorneys is made easier by the lack of a defense
to knowledge of the illegal origin of the clients' fees. Counsel is made aware
of the indictments against the defendant prior to accepting representation
fees and could have required the client to verify the source of the funds. 10
Failure to inquire would not constitute a valid defense because the attorney's
actions would constitute willful blindness. 0 2 In effect, if the client is found
guilty, the prosecution will have little difficulty in convicting the client's

attorney. 103
Because the attorney's liability under section 1957 is based, in part, on the
outcome of his client's case, the attorney's representation will be skewed in
favor of protecting his own self-interest instead of the best interests of his
client. An attorney may negotiate a plea or change trial tactics which benefit
counsel at the client's expense. For example, in return for a guilty plea, or
similar concession, the attorney may bargain for the inclusion of a stipulation
that assets transferred to the attorney were not the proceeds of criminal
activity specified in the statute. 0 4 Alternatively, if no deals are made
concerning the attorney's fee, counsel may advise his client to go to trial with
an innocent plea rather than a guilty plea, even though a guilty plea may
0 5
better serve the client's interest.
99.
100.
101.
102.

18 U.S.C. § 1957(a).
See supra note 1.
See supra text accompanying note 38.
S. REP. 433, supra note 2, at 10 (as defined in United States v. Jewel, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976)).
103. For two cases which discuss this situation and the resulting effects on the client's sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, see infra text accompanying notes 106-10.
104. In cases which include the possibility of attorney fee forfeiture, the Department of Justice
Guidelines, supra note 8, at 3008, authorize agreements which exempt from forfeiture an asset
transferred to an attorney for legal fees. The Guidelines also state that it is inappropriate to give
notice that a fee may be forfeitable for the purpose of harassing attorneys or for the purpose of
"targeting certain attorneys and attempting to prevent them from representing criminal defendants
in certain cases." Id. at 3006. Furthermore, the Wall StreetJournalreports that -[an internal Justice
Dept. memorandum has cautioned restraint [in using the money laundering provisions against
defense lawyers], and orders that any indictment against lawyers involving fees be cleared first in
Washington." Allen, Defense Lawyers Fear Becoming Targets Under Sweeping Money Laundering Law, Wall
St. J., Dec. 2, 1986, at 35, col. 4.
105. For a similar analysis of this type of conflict of interest in cases which involve the forfeiture
of attorney fees, see United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (such action
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Recently, the Second and Third Circuits have held that an actual conflict
of interest arose in situations similar to the one presently discussed. In
Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 106 the court held that the defendant's sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because his
attorney was potentially liable for aiding and abetting or encouraging the
defendant's illegal conduct. The court reasoned that "it is unrealistic" to
assume that the defendant's "attorney vigorously pursued his client's best
interest entirely free from the influence of his concern to avoid his own
incrimination."

07

Similarly, in United States v. Cancilla,108 the court held that representation
by an attorney who possibly committed similar crimes, which were linked to
the client's criminal activity, constituted "a per se violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel." The court reasoned that
the attorney might not have vigorously defended the client due to the
possibility of uncovering evidence that would reveal the attorney's own
crime. 109

Application of the rationale of these two cases to a defendant whose
attorney is threatened with prosecution for money laundering leads to the

conclusion that the money laundering provisions create a conflict of interest
which separates the client's and the attorney's best interests and violates the
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. 1 0 In summary, section
1957 places an attorney who accepts a bona fide representation fee in a direct
conflict with his client, thus depriving that client of his sixth amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel.' "
2. Chilling of Attorney-Client Communications. A second impediment to a
client's right to effective assistance of counsel arises when the attorney-client
would violate the attorney's duty to give independent advice solely for the benefit of his client under
the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(A), EC 5-1,2,3,7 (1981)). See also
Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 71, at 741 (prosecutor may offer a plea to a count that does not
require forfeiture); Note, Against Forfeiture of Attorney's Fees Under RICO, supra note 8, at 142 (attorney
may be forced to negotiate rather than risk conviction and forfeiture at trial); Note, Forfeiture of
Attorney's Fees, supra note 8, at 1180-81 (attorney may be forced to choose a litigation strategy which
would protect his interests rather than choosing a strategy which would keep his client out ofjail, but
would subject the attorney's fee to forfeiture).
106. 748 F.2d 125, 136 (3d Cir. 1984).
107. Id.
108. 725 F.2d 867, 870 (2d Cir. 1984).
109. Id. at 870-71.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
111. One may effectively waive his right to conflicted counsel if the waiver is elected intelligently,
knowingly, and voluntarily. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938). The voluntary standard
requires that defendants have a meaningful choice between viable alternatives. Sacrificing one right
without utilizing another is not a meaningful choice. See United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775,
787-88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998 (1976); Note, A Case of Ineffective Assistance, supra note 62, at
633-34.
Threatening prosecution against a defendant's attorney forces the defendant (via the effect of the
money laundering provisions) to either waive his rights to unconflicted private counsel or to accept
inadequate public representation. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Thus, the defendant is
involuntarily forced into a situation in which he must choose to waive his sixth amendment right to
unconflicted counsel in order to obtain adequate representation.
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privilege is threatened. Although the privilege is not recognized as an
independent constitutional right," 2 it is essential to the constitutionally
required right to effective assistance of counsel because the privilege
encourages clients to make full and frank disclosures."13
An attorney threatened with prosecution for accepting bona fide
representation fees will be forced to choose between limiting the investigation
in order not to discover any information which may be used against him in a
subsequent money laundering prosecution, and inquiring fully into the
14
client's case in order to prepare and present competent legal advice."
Further, the client may feel compelled to withhold information from the
attorney fearing that the attorney may be forced to disclose the information in
his own defense in a subsequent money laundering prosecution. Thus, the
money laundering provisions create a situation which chills communication
between the attorney and client. Without protection of the client's attorney
from the threat of prosecution, a defendant's right to effective assistance of
counsel is compromised.
3. Potential for Prosecutorial Abuse and Manipulation Threatens Justice in the
Adversarial System. To apply the money laundering provisions to attorneys
who take bona fide representation fees will tip the scales of justice in favor of
the prosecution and result in the denial of the defendant's due process rights.
The current money laundering provisions compromise the defendant's right
to effective assistance of counsel by creating conflicts of interest and chilling
attorney-client communications. 1 5 However, potentially the largest and most
serious problem is one of prosecutorial manipulation. The money laundering
provisions could be improperly used to selectively threaten prosecution or
institute grand jury investigations and, hence, force competent defense
attorneys to withdraw from a case due to concerns over imprisonment, ethical
112. The attorney-client privilege is a creature of the common law and state legislatures. See, e.g.,
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1932). In federal courts, Rule 501 controls; it provides that
"the privilege of a witness ... shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason and experience." FED. R. EVID. 501.
113. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (effective advocacy depends on the
attorney being fully informed); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (attorney cannot
discharge his duties if he is not fully informed); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (full
disclosure is necessary for the administration ofjustice).
114. This dilemma is compounded by the requirements of the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1981), which provides that:

A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer, and a lawyer must be
equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client. A lawyer should be
fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full
advantage of our legal system.
See also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-3.1, 4-3.2 (2d ed. 1980) (attorney should seek full
disclosure of all facts and encourage clients to be candid).
These standards and duties require the attorney to choose the first alternative of seeking full
information regardless of the consequences. However, it is hard to imagine a defense attorney who
would advocate his client's position when the result would be to subject himself to criminal or civil
liability. See supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
115. See supra parts III.C.I. and III.C.2.
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violations involving conflicts of interest, and economic pressure." 16 Further,
this tactic could be used repeatedly until the prosecution approves or agrees
t7
with the defendant's choice of counsel."
The effect of potential prosecutorial manipulation is a denial of due
process as the "balance of forces between the accused and his accuser" are
skewed." 8 Furthermore, threatening prosecution against a defendant's
counsel for taking bona fide representation fees undermines the "very
premise of our adversar[ial] system of criminal justice" which is "that partisan
advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that
the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."' 1 9
IV
CONCLUSION

Constitutional infringement of a defendant's rights is the unfortunate
result of the newest tactic in the war on drugs, gambling, and vice. This
infringement denies the defendant his sixth amendment rights to counsel,
counsel of choice, and effective assistance of counsel. It arises from
threatening and subjecting the defendant's attorney, who takes bona fide
representation fees, to criminal and civil prosecution. By failing to focus on
the roots of the U.S. vice problem, namely public demand, ignorance of users,
and profit motivation, Congress has adopted a statute which is
unconstitutionally overinclusive since it violates a defendant's due process
and sixth amendment rights. If this new federal enforcement tool is to be
used at all, courts must 120 construe the Money Laundering Contol Act
narrowly in order to exclude from the Act's provisions attorneys who take
bona fide representation fees.
Adam K Weinstein

116. See supra notes 63-66, 78 and accompanying text.
117. In analyzing the impact of prosecutorial discretion on attorney fee forfeiture cases, the court
in United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1322, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985), stated: "The government would
possess the ultimate tactical advantage of being able to exclude competent defense counsel as it
chooses.... While I presume that most prosecutors act in good faith, I cannot ignore the potentialfor
prosecutorialmanipulation.. " (emphasis added).
118. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973).
119. 602 F. Supp. at 1350 (citing Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)).
120. See supra note 43.

